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Eurasism is an ideological and social-political current born within
the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, united by the
concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, presenting – among
the varied world cultures – an original combination of western and eastern
features; as a consequence, the Russian culture belongs to both East and
West, and at the same time cannot be reduced neither to the former nor
to the latter.
The founders of eurasism
N.S. Trubetskoy (1890-1938) – filologist and linguist
P.N. Savitsky (1895-1965) – geographer, economist
G.V. Florovsky (1893-1979) – historian of culture, theologian
and patriot
G.V. Vernadsky ( 1877-1973) – historian and geopolitician
N.N. Alekseev - jurist and politologist
V.N. Ilin – historian of culture, literary scholar and theologian.
Eurasism’s main value consisted in ideas born out of the depth of the
tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasism looked at the Russian
culture not as to a simple component of the European civilization, as to
an original civilization, summarizing the experience not only of the West
as also – to the same extent – of the East. The Russian people, in this
perspective, must not be placed neither among the European nor among the
Asian peoples; it belongs to a fully original Eurasian ethnic community.
Such originality of the Russian culture and statehood (showing at the same
time European and Asian features) also defines the peculiar historical
path of Russia, her national-state program, not coinciding with the Western-European
tradition.
Foundations
Civilization concept
The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles
and values, and promoted it to the rank of universal system. This Roman-German
system has been imposed on the other peoples and cultures by force and
ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind
is a negative phenomenon. Each people and culture has its own intrinsic
right to evolve according to its own logics. Russia is an original
civilization. She is called not only to counter the West, fully safeguarding
its own road, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and
countries on Earth defending their own freedom as civilizations.
Criticism of the Roman-German civilization
The Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularization
of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to he
the fore such values like individualism, egoism, competition, technical
progress, consumption, economic exploitation. The Roman-German civiilization
founds its right to globality not upon spiritual greatness, as upon rough
material force. Even the spirituality and strength of the other peoples
are evaluated only on the basis of its own image of the supremacy of rationalism
and technical progress.
The space factor
There are no universal patterns of development. The plurality of landscapes
on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles,
internal criteria and logics. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes
decisive) influence on peoples’ culture and national history. Every people,
as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates
its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic and
political forms. The “place” where any people or state “development” happens
predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this “development”
– up to the point when the two elements became one. It is impossible to
separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations
must proceed not only along the temporal axis (“before”, “after”, “development”
or “non-development”, and so on) as also along the spatial axis (“east”,
“west”, “steppe”, “mountains” and so on).
No single state or region has the right to pretend to be the standard
for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its
own “times”, its own “rationality”, and deserves to be understood and evaluated
according to its own internal criteria.
The climate of Europe, the small extension of its spaces, the influence
of its landscapes generated the peculiarity of the European civilization,
where the influences of the wood (northern Europe) and of the coast (Mediterraneum)
prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations:
the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to
the Turks), the loess lands the Chinese one, the mountain islands the Japanese
one, the union of steppe and woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of
landscape lives in the whole history of each one of these civilizations,
and cannot be either separated form them or suppressed.
State and nation
The first Russian slavophiles in the XIX century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky)
insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of the Russian (Slav, Orthodox)
civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against
the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds
from the West), on the other. The slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition,
the greatness of the ancient times, the love for the Russian past, and
warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about the extraneousness
of Russia to many aspects of the Western pattern.
From this school the eurasists inherited the positions of the latest
slavophiles and further developed their theses in the sense of a positive
evaluation of the Eastern influences.
The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of the Russian
statehood. The national idea achieves a new status; after Moscow’s refusal
to recognize the Florentine Unia (arrest and proscription of the metropolitan
Isidore) and the rapid decay, the Tsargrad Rus’ inherits the flag of the
Orthodox empire.
Political platform
Wealth and prosperity, a strong state and an efficient economy, a powerful
army and the development of production must be the instruments for the
achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can
be conferred only through the existence of a “leading idea”. That political
regime, which supposes the establishment of a “leading idea” as a supreme
value, was called by the eurasists as “ideocracy” – from the greek “idea”
and “kratos”, power. Russia is always thought of as the Sacred Rus’, as
a power [derzhava] fulfilling its own peculiar historical mission. The
eurasist world-view must also be the national idea of the forthcoming Russia,
its “leading idea”.
The eurasist choice
Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a steppe and woods empire of continental
dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of
all, the ethics of collective responsibility, disinterest, reciprocal help,
ascetism, will and tenaciousness. Only such qualities can allow keeping
under control the wide and scarcely populated lands of the steppe-woodland
Eurasian zone. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism,
asceticism, warlike virtue and rigid hierarchy.
Western democracy was formed in the particular conditions of ancient
Athens and through the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy
mirrors the peculiar features of the “local European development”. Such
democracy does not represent an universal standard. Imitating the rules
of the European “liberal-democracy” is senseless, impossible and dangerous
for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people to the political
rule must be defined by a different term: “demotia”, from the greek “demos”,
people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized
into party-parliamentary structures. “Demotia” supposes a system of land
council, district governments or national governments (in the case of peoples
of small dimensions). It is developed on the basis of social self-government,
of the “peasant” world. An example of “demotia” is the elective nature
of church hierarchies on behalf of the parishioners in the Muscovite Rus’.
The work of L.N. Gumilev as a development of the eurasist thinking
Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912-1922), son of he Russian poet N.Gumilev
amd of the poetess A.Akhmatova, was an etnographer, historian and
philosopher.
He was profoundly influenced by the book of the kalmuck eurasist E.Khara-Vadan
“Gengis-Khan as an army leader” and by the works of Savitsky. In its own
works Gumilev developed the fundamental eurasist theses. Towards the end
of his life he used to call himself as “the last of the eurasists”.
Basic elements of Gumilev’s theory
The theory of passionarity [passionarnost’] as a development of
the eurasist idealism;
The essence of which, in his own view, lays in the fact that every ethnos,
as a natural formation, is subject to the influence of some “energetic
drives”, born out of the cosmos and causing the “passionarity effect”,
that is an extreme activity and intensity of life. In such conditions the
ethnos undergoes a “genetic mutation”, which leads to the birth of the
“passionaries” – individuals of a special temper and talent. And those
become the creators of new ethnos , cultures and states;
Drawing the scientific attention upon the proto-history of the “nomad empires”
of the East and the discovery of the colossal ethnic and cultural heritage
of the autochtone ancient Asian peoples, which was wholly passed to the
great culture of the ancient epoch, but afterwards fell into oblivion (Huns,
Turks, Mongols, and so on);
The development of a turkophile attitude in the theory of “ethnic complementarity”.
ETHNOS in in general any set of individuals, any “collective”: people,
population, nation, tribe, family clan, based on a common historical destiny.
“Our Great-Russian ancestors – wrote Gumilev – in the XV, XVI and XVII
century easily and rather quickly mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars
and with the Buriates, who assimilated the Russian culture. The same Great-Russian
easily mixed with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming
into friendly contact with Kazakhs and Kalmucks. Through marriage links
they pacifically coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols
themselves and the Turks between the XIV and XVI centuries were fused with
the Russians in Central Russia”. Therefore the history of the Muscovite
Rus’ cannot be understood without the framework of the ethnic contacts
betwen Russians and Tatars and the history of the Eurasian continent.
The advent of neo-eurasism: historical and social context
The crisis of the Soviet paradigm
In the mid-1980s the Soviet society began to lose its connection and ability
to adequately reflect upon the external environment and itself. The Soviet
models of self-understanding were showing their cracks. The society had
lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, yet
this was but a confused feeling, as no-one could tell the way the change
would come from. In that time a rather unconvincing divide began to form:
“forces of progress” and “forces of reaction”, “reformers” and “conservators
of the past”, “partizans of reforms” and “enemies of reforms”.
Infatuation for the western models
In that situation the term of “reforms” became in itself a synonym of “liberal-democracy”.
A hasty conclusion was inferred, from the objective fact of the crisis
of the Soviet system, about the superiority of the western model and the
necessity to copy it. At the theoretical level this was all but self-evident,
since the “ideological map” offers a sharply more diversified system of
choices than the primitive dualism: socialism vs. capitalism, Warsaw Accord
– NATO. Yet it was just that primitive logics that prevailed: the “partizans
of reforms” became the unconditional apologists of the West, whose structure
and logics they were ready to assimilate, while the “enemies of reforms”
proved to be the inertial preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure
and logics they lesser and lesser could catch. In such condition of lack
of balance, the reformers / pro-westerners had on their side a potential
of energy, novelty, expectations of change, creative drive, perspectives,
while the “reactionaries” had nothing left but inertness, immobilism, the
appeal to the customary and already-known. Just in this psychologic and
aesthetical outfit the liberal-democratic policy prevailed in the Russia
of the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious
choice.
The collapse of the state unity
The result of “reforms” was the collapse of the Soviet state unity and
the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the USSR. The destruction
of the Soviet system and “rationality” was not accompanied by the creation
of a new system and a new rationality in conformity to the national and
historical conditions. There gradually prevailed a peculiar attitude toward
Russia and her national history: the past, present and future of Russia
began to be seen from the point of view of the West, to be evaluated as
something stranger, transcending, alien (“this country” was the “reformers’”
typical expression). That was not the Russian view of the West, as the
Western view of Russia. No wonder that in such condition the adoption of
the western schemes even in the “reformers’” theory was invoked not in
order to create and strengthen the structure of the national state unity,
but in order to destroy its remains. The destruction of the state was not
a casual outcome of the “reforms”; as a matter of fact, it was among their
strategical aims.
The birth of an anti-western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet
environment
In the course of the “reforms” and their “deepening”, the inadequacy of
the simple reaction began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989-90)
began the formation of a “national-patriotic opposition”, in which there
was the confluence of part of the “Soviet conservatives” (ready to a minimal
level of reflection), groups of “reformers” disappointed with “reforms”
or “having become conscious of their anti-state direction”, and groups
of representatives of the patriotic movements, which had already formed
during the perestroika and tried to shape the sentiment of “state power”
[derzhava] in a non-communist (orthodox-monarchic, nationalist,
etc.) context. With a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of
external strategic, intellectual and material support, the conceptual model
of post-Soviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.
Neo-eurasism
Neo-eurasism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon,
gradually turning into one of the main directions of the post-Soviet Russian
patriotic self-consciousness.
Stages of development of the neo-eurasist ideology
1st stage (1985-90)
Dugin’s seminars and lectures to various groups of the new-born conservative-patriotic
movement. Criticism of the Soviet paradigm as lacking the spiritual and
national qualitative element.
In 1989 first publications on the review “Sovetskaya literatura” [Soviet
Literature]. Dugin’s books are issued in Italy (“Continente Russia” [Continent
Russia], 1989) and in Spain (“Rusia Misterio de Eurasia” [Russia, Mystery
of Eurasia], 1990).
In 1990 issue of Rйnй Guйnon’s “Crisis of the modern
world” with comments by Dugin, and of Dugin’s “The Paths of the Absolute”
[Puti Absoljuta], with the exposition of the foundations of the traditionalist
philosophy.
In these years eurasism shows “right-wing conservative” features, close
to historical traditionalism, with orthodox-monarchic, “ethnic-pochevennik”
[i.e. linked to the ideas of soil and land] elements, sharply critic of
“left-wing” ideologies.
2nd stage (1991-93)
Begins the revision of the anti-communism, typical of the first stage of
neo-eurasism. Revaluation of the Soviet period in the spirit of “national-bolshevism”
and “left-wing eurasism”.
Journey to Moscow of the main representatives of the “New Right” (Alain
de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Carlo Terracciano, Marco Battarra, Claudio
Mutti and others).
Eurasism becomes popular among the patriotic opposition and the intellectuals.
On the basis of terminological affinity, A.Sakharov already speaks about
Eurasia, though only in a strictly geographic - instead of political and
geopolitical – sense (and without ever making use of eurasism in itself,
like he was before a convinced atlantist); a group of “democrats” tries
to start a project of “democratic eurasism” (G.Popov, S.Stankevic, L.Ponomarev).
O.Lobov, O.Soskovets, S.Baburin also speak about their own eurasism.
In 1992-93 is issued the first number of “Elements. Eurasist review”.
Lectures on geopolitics and the foundations of eurasism in high schools
and universities. Many translations, articles, seminars.
3rd stage (1994-98): theoretical development of the neo-eurasist orthodoxy
Issue of Dugin’s main works “Mysteries of Eurasia” [Misterii Evrazii] (1996),
“Conspirology” [Konspirologija] (1994), “Foundations of geopolitics” [Osnovy
Geopolitiki] (1996), “The conservative revolution ” [Konservativnaja revoljutsija]
(1994), “Knight Templars of the Proletariat” [Tampliery proletariata] (1997).
Works of Trubetskoy, Vernadsky, Alekseev and Savitsky are issued by “Agraf”
editions (1995-98).
Direct and indirect references to eurasism appear in the programs of the
KPFR (Communist Party], LDPR [Liberal-democratic Party] e NDR [New Democratic
Russia] (that is left, right, and centre). Growing number of publications
on eurasist themes. Issue of many eurasist digests.
Criticism of eurasism from Russian nationalists, religious fundamentalists
and orthodox communists, and also from the liberals.
Manifestations of an academic “weak“ version of eurasism (prof. A.S.Panarin,
V.Ya.Paschenko, F.Girenok and others) – with elements of the illuminist
paradigm, denied by the eurasist orthodoxy – then evolving towards more
radically anti-western, anti-liberal and anti-gobalist positions.
Inauguration of a university dedicated to L.Gumilev in Astan [Kazakhstan].
4th stage (1998-2001)
Gradual de-identification of neo-eurasism vis-а-vis the collateral
political-cultural and party manifestations, turn to the autonomous direction
(“Arctogaia”, “New University”, “Irruption” [Vtorzhenie] – outside the
opposition and the extreme left and right-wing movements.
Apology of staroobrjadchestvo [Old Rite].
Shift to centrist political positions, supporting Primakov as the new premier.
Dugin becomes the adviser to the Duma speaker G.N.Seleznev.
Issue of the eurasist booklet “Our Path” [Nash put’] (1998).
Issue of “Eurasist Irruption” [Evraziikoe Vtorzhenie] as a supplement to
“Zavtra”. growing distance from the opposition and shift closer to the
government’s positions.
Theoretical researches, elaborations, issue of “The Russian Thing” [Russkaja
vesch’] (2001), publications on “Nezavisimaja Gazeta”, “Moskovskij Novosti”,
radio broadcasts about “Finis Mundi” on Radio 101, radio broadcasts on
geopolitical subjects and neo-eurasism on Radio “Svobodnaja Rossija” (1998-2000).
5th stage (2001-2002)
Foundation of the Pan-Russian Political Social Movement EURASIA on “radical
centre” positions, declaration of full support to the President of the
Russian Federation V.V.Putin (21 April 2001).
The leader of the Centre of Spiritual Management of the Russian Muslims,
sheik-ul-islam Talgat Tadjuddin, adheres to EURASIA.
Issue of the periodical “Evraziizkoe obozrenie” [Eurasist Review].
Appearance of the Jewish neo-eurasism (A.Eskin, A.Shmulevic, V.Bukarsky).
Conference on “Islamic Threat or Threat to Islam?”. Intervention by H.A.Noukhaev,
Chechen theorist of the ”islamic eurasism” (“Vedeno or Washington?”, Moscow,
2001].
Issue of books by E.Khara-Davan and Ya.Bromberg (2002).
Process of transformation of the Movement EURASIA into a party (2002).
Basic philosophical positions of neo-eurasism
At the theoretical level neo-eurasism consists of the revival of
the classic principles of the movement in a qualitatively new historical
phase, and of the transformation of such principles into the foundations
of an ideological and political program and a world-view. The heritage
of the classic eurasists was accepted as the fundamental world-view for
the ideal (political) struggle in the post-Soviet period, as the spiritual-political
platform of “total patriotism”.
The neo-eurasists took over the basic positions of classical eurasism,
chose them as a platform, as starting points, as the main theoretical bases
and foundations for the future development and practical use. In the theoretical
field, neo-eurasists consciously developed the main principles of classical
eurasism taking into account the wide philosophical, cultural and political
framework of the ideas of the XX century.
Each one of the main positions of the classical eurasists (see the
chapter on the “Foundations of classical eurasism”) revived its own conceptual
development.
Civilization concept
Criticism of the western bourgeois society from “left-wing” (social) positions
was superimposed to the criticism of the same society from “right-wing”
(civilizational) positions. The eurasist idea about the “rejecting the
West” is reinforced by the rich weaponry of the “criticism of the West”
by the same representatives of the West who disagree with the logics of
its development (at least in the last centuries). The eurasist came only
gradually, since the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, to this idea
of the fusion of the most different (and often politically contradictory)
concepts denying the “normative” character of the Western civilization.
The “criticism of the Roman-German civilization” was thoroughly stressed, being based on the prioritary analysis of
the Anglo-saxon world, of the US. According to the spirit of the German
Conservative Revolution and of the European “New Right”, the “Western world”
was differentiated into an atlantic component (the US + England) and into
a continental European component (properly speaking, a Roman-German component).
Continental Europe is seen here as a neutral phenomenon, liable to be integrated
– on some given conditions – in the eurasist project.
The spatial factor
Neo-eurasism is moved by the idea of the complete revision of the history
of philosophy according to spatial positions. Here find their trait-d’union
the most various models of the cyclical vision of history, from Danilevsky
to Spengler, from Toynbee to Gumilev.
Such principle finds its most pregnant expression in traditionalist
philosophy, which denies the ideas of evolution and progress and founds
this denial upon detailed metaphysical calculations. Hence the traditional
theory of “cosmic cycles”, of the “multiple states of Being”, of “sacred
geography”, and so on. The basic principles of the theory of cycles are
illustrated into detail by the works of Guйnon (and his followers
G.Georgel, T.Burckhardt, M.Eliade, A.Corbin). A full rehabilitation has
been given to the concept of “traditional society”, either knowing no history
at all, or realizing it according to the rites and myths of the “eternal
return”. The history of Russia is seen not simply as one of the many local
developments, but as the vanguard of the spatial system (East) opposed
to the “temporal” one (West).
State and nation
Dialectics of national history
It is led up to its final, “dogmatical” formulation, including the historiosophic
paradigm of “national-bolshevism” (N.Ustryalov) and its interpretation
(M.Agursky). The pattern is as follows:
The Kiev period as the announce of the forthcoming national mission (IX-XIII
centuries);
Mongolian-Tatar invasion as a scud against the levelling European trends,
the geopolitical and administrative push of the Hoard is handed over to
the Russians, division of the Russians between western and eastern Russians,
differentiation among cultural kinds, formation of the Great-Russians on
the basis of the “eastern Russians” under the Hoard’s control (XIII-XV
centuries);
The Muscovite Empire as the climax of the national-religious mission of
Rus’ (Third Rome) (XV-end of the XVII century);
Roman-German yoke (Romanov), collapse of the national unity, separation
between a pro-western йlite and the national mass (end of the XVII-beginning
of the XX century);
oviet period, revenge of the national mass, period of the “Soviet messianism”,
re-establishment of the basic parameters of the main muscovite line (XX
century);
Phase of troubles, that must end with a new eurasist push (beginning of
the XXI century).
Political platform
Neo-eurasism owns the methodology of Vilfrido Pareto’s school, moves within
the logic of the rehabilitation of “organic hierarchy”, gathers some nietzschean
motives, develops the doctrine of the “ontology of power”, of the Christian
Orthodox concept of power as “kat’echon”. The idea of “йlite”
completes the constructions of the European traditionalists, authors of
researches about the system of castes in the anciet society and of their
ontology and sociology (R.Guйnon, J.Evola, J.Dumйzil, L.Dumont).
Gumilevic’s theory of “passionarity” lays at the roots of the concept of
“new eurasist йlite”.
The thesis of “demotia” is the continuation of the political theories of the “organic democracy”
from J.J. Rousseau to C.Schmitt, J.Freund, A.de Benoist and A.Mueller van
der Bruck. Definition of the eurasist concept of “democracy” (“demotia”)
as the “participation of the people to ist own destiny”.
The thesis of “ideocracy” gives a foundation to the call to the ideas of “conservative revolution”
and “third way”, in the light of the experience of Soviet, Israeli and
Islamic ideocracies, analyses the reason of their historical failure. The
critical reflection upon the qualitative content of the XX century ideocracy
brings to the consequent criticism of the Soviet period (supremacy of quantitative
concepts and secular theories, disproportionate weight of the classist
conception).
The following elements contribute to the development
of the ideas of the classical eurasists:
The philosophy of traditionalism (Guйnon, Evola, Burckhardt,
Corbin), the idea of the radical decay of the “modern world”, profound
teaching of the Tradition. The global concept of “modern world” (negative
category) as the antithesis of the “world of Tradition” (positive category)
gives the criticism of the Western civilization a basic metaphysic character,
defining the eschatological, critical, fatal content of the fundamental
(intellectual, technological, political and economic) processes having
their origin in the West. The intuitions of the Russian conservatives,
from the slavophiles to the classical eurasists, are completed by a fundamental
theoretical base. (see A.Dugin, “The Absolute Homeland ” [Absoljutnaja
Rodina], Moscow 1999; “The End of the World” [Konets Sveta], Moscow 1997;
“Julius Evola et le conservatisme russe”, Rome 1997).
The investigation on the origins of sacredness (M.Eliade, K.G.Jung,
C.Levi-Strauss), the representations of the archaic consciousness as
the manifestationist paradigmatic complex laying at the roots of culture.
The reduction of the many-sided human thinking, of culture, to ancient
psychic layers, where are concentrated fragments of archaic initiatic rites,
myths, originary sacral complexes. Interpretation of the content of rational
culture through the system of the ancient, pre-rational beliefs (A.Dugin,
“The evolution of the paradigmatic foundations of science” [Evoljutsija
paradigmal’nyh osnovanij nauki], Moscow 2002).
The search for the symbolic paradigms of the space-time matrix,
which lays at the roots of rites, languages and symbols (H.Wirth,
paleo-epigraphic investigations). This attempt to give a foundation to
the linguistic (Svityc-Illic), epigraphic (runology), mythological, folkloric,
ritual and different monuments allows to rebuild an original map of the
“sacred concept of the world” common to all the ancient Eurasian peoples,
the existence of common roots (see A.Dugin “Hyperborean Theory” [Giperborejskaja
Teorija], Moscow 1993.
A reassessment of the development of geopolitical ideas in the West
(Mackinder, Haushofer, Lohhausen, Spykman, Brzeszinski, Thiriart and
others). Since Mackinder’s epoch, the geopolitical science has sharply
evolved. The role of geopolitical constants in the XX century history appeared
so clear as to make of geopolitics an autonomous discipline. Within the
geopolitical framework, the concept itself of “eurasism” and “Eurasia”
acquired a new, wider meaning. Fome some time onwards, eurasism, in a geopolitical
sense, began to indicate the continental configuration of a strategic (existing
or potential) bloc, created around Russia or its enlarged base, and antagonist
(either actively or passively) to the strategic initiatives of the opposed
geopolitical pole – “atlantism”, at the head of which at the mid-XX century
the US came to outplace England. The philosophy and the political idea
of the Russian classics of eurasism in this situation have been considered
as the most consequent and powerful expression (fulfilment) of eurasism
in its strategic and geopolitical meaning. Thanks to the development of
geopolitical investigations (A.Dugin, “Foundations of geopolitics” [Osnovye
geopolitiki], Moscow 1997] neo-eurasism becomes a methodologically evolved
phenomenon. Especially remarkable is the meaning of the Land – Sea pair
(according to Carl Schmitt), the projection of this pair upon a plurality
of phenomena – from the history of religions to economics.
The search for a global alternative to mondialism (globalism), as
an ultra-modern phenomenon, summarizing everything that is evaluated by
eurasism (and neo-eurasism) as negative. Eurasism in a wider meaning becomes
the conceptual platform of anti-globalism, or of the alternative globalism.
“Eurasism” gathers all contemporary trends denying globalism any objective
(let alone positive) content, it offers the anti-globalist intuition a
new character of doctrinal generalization.
The assimilation of the social criticism of the “new left” into a “conservative
right-wing interpretation” (reflection upon the heritage of M.Foucault,
G.Deleuze, A.Artaud, G.Dйbord). Assimilation of the critical
thinking of the opponents of the bourgeois western system from the positions
of anarchism, neo-marxism and so on. This conceptual pole represents a
new stage of development of the “left-wing” (national-bolshevik) tendencies
existing also among the first eurasists (Suvchinskij, Karsavin, Efron),
and also a method for the mutual understanding with the “left” wing of
anti-globalism.
“Third way” economics, “autarchy of the great spaces”. Application
of heterodox economic models to the post-Soviet Russian reality. Application
of F.List’s theory of the “custom unions”. Actualization of the
theories of S.Gesell. F.Schumpeter, F.Leroux, new eurasist
reading of Keynes.
